Previous models of category-based induction have neglected how the process of induction unfolds over time. We conceive of induction as a dynamic process and provide the first fine-grained examination of the distribution of response times observed in inductive reasoning. We used these data to develop and empirically test the first major quantitative modeling scheme that simultaneously accounts for inductive decisions and their time course. The model assumes that knowledge of similarity relations among novel test probes and items stored in memory drive an accumulation-to-bound sequential sampling process: Test probes with high similarity to studied exemplars are more likely to trigger a generalization response, and more rapidly, than items with low exemplar similarity. We contrast data and model predictions for inductive decisions with a recognition memory task using a common stimulus set. Hierarchical Bayesian analyses across 2 experiments demonstrated that inductive reasoning and recognition memory primarily differ in the threshold to trigger a decision: Observers required less evidence to make a property generalization judgment (induction) than an identity statement about a previously studied item (recognition). Experiment 1 and a condition emphasizing decision speed in Experiment 2 also found evidence that inductive decisions use lower quality similarity-based information than recognition. The findings suggest that induction might represent a less cautious form of recognition. We conclude that sequential sampling models grounded in exemplar-based similarity, combined with hierarchical Bayesian analysis, provide a more fine-grained and informative analysis of the processes involved in inductive reasoning than is possible solely through examination of choice data.
Category-based induction involves using knowledge of the relations between categories to generalize novel properties of category exemplars. Two decades of research on category-based induction has revealed much about the cognitive processes that lead people to make inductive inferences (for reviews, see Hayes & Heit, 2013b; Kemp & Jern, 2014) . This work, however, has largely neglected a crucial dimension of the inductive process: how inductive inferences are made over time.
Inductive inferences (e.g., Does this item share the same properties as known category members?) do not take place instantaneously. Rather, an individual must consider the similarity between the test item and known category members over time until they are sufficiently confident to make a decision about property generalization. Notably, the relation between response time and decision is unlikely to be fixed; it will likely vary according to whether speed or accuracy of performance is emphasized and whether one or the other of the response options (i.e., to generalize or not to generalize) is more probable or weighted more heavily.
Although some studies have examined the effects of varying decision deadlines on inductive judgments (e.g., Bright & Feeney, 2014; Hayes & Heit, 2013a; Shafto, Coley, & Baldwin, 2007) or used reading time as a measure of reasoning (Feeney, Coley, & Crisp, 2010) , theoretical models of induction have generally ignored such temporal factors. Models such as the similarity coverage model (e.g., Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir, 1990) , feature-based induction (Sloman, 1993) , and Bayesian models (Heit, 1998; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009 ) offer explanations for a range of decision phenomena in induction but do not address the temporal dynamics of these decisions. This is unfortunate because it limits our ability to test alternative processing accounts of induction. Consider, for example, the well-established finding of premise monotonicity such that generalization of a novel property to other category members is positively related to the number of category members known to possess that property (Feeney, 2007; Osherson et al., 1990) . Hence, a property shared by hawks, sparrows, eagles, and pigeons is more likely to generalize to other birds than a property shared by only two instances. Models such as similarity coverage primarily attribute this effect to the fact that the members of the larger set are more similar (on average) to members of the inclusive category.
From a dynamic perspective, this explanation for monotonicity effects suggests that the similarity-based evidence for the generalization of the property is accumulated more rapidly over time following presentation of four compared with two positive instances. However, a dynamic framework offers alternative interpretations. It may be that increasing the size of the premise set induces a bias toward a generalization response, which is akin to lowering the threshold or amount of evidence required to trigger property generalization. It is also possible that changing the size of the premise set affects both the strength of similarity-based evidence and biases toward property generalization. Such a finding can be seen as analogous to the effects of list strength and response bias manipulations on recognition, which are best explained by the combined effect of the quality or speed of evidence accumulation and decision thresholds (Criss, 2010) .
These alternative interpretations of induction phenomena cannot be discriminated based on inductive decision data alone; they require consideration of how decisions are made over time. This mirrors Criss's (2010) conclusion that the accumulation and threshold accounts in recognition could not be discriminated when only decisions (and not response times) were analyzed. The major aim of the current work was to take the first step to address this empirical and theoretical gap by concurrently examining decision and response time data in inductive reasoning. To this end, we developed a sequential sampling model of inductive judgment that allows for the separate evaluation of different dynamic components of inductive responding, including the rate of accumulation of similarity-based evidence and biases toward or against property generalization in terms of the amount of evidence required to commit to a decision.
In the current studies, we collected decision and response time data in two tasks-induction and recognition memory. There were two reasons for this. A number of sequential sampling models have been developed and successfully applied to explain patterns of dynamic responding in recognition (e.g., Criss, 2010; Donkin & Nosofsky, 2012; Rae, Heathcote, Donkin, Averell, & Brown, 2014; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Starns, 2013; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004) . The recognition data therefore served as a benchmark for measuring the success of our sequential sampling approach to induction.
Second, we aimed to advance understanding of the common and distinctive processes that drive induction and recognition. Memory and reasoning have traditionally been treated as distinct cognitive activities, studied using different stimuli and different experimental paradigms, leading to different types of theoretical accounts. Major models of memory (for reviews, see Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006, and Wixted, 2007) typically do not address processes of inference from studied items. Likewise, models of inductive reasoning (e.g., Heit, 1998; Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009; Osherson et al., 1990; Sloman, 1993) provide few details about retrieval processes.
Recent work, however, suggests a more nuanced view of the relationship between induction and recognition (Hayes, Heit, & Rotello, 2014; Heit, Rotello, & Hayes, 2012) . There are a number of in-principle parallels between the processes that operate in induction and recognition. In each task, the presentation of a test probe is likely to cue retrieval of a sample of previously experienced instances. Decisions in each task (whether the test item has been seen before; whether the test item shares a property with the study set) could be seen as driven by an assessment of the similarity between the test probe and the retrieved sample.
These hypothesized parallels have been supported in studies comparing induction and recognition responses to a common set of study and test items (Hayes & Heit, 2013a; Hayes, Fritz, & Heit, 2013; Heit & Hayes, 2011) . Notably, these same studies also revealed a reliable empirical difference between the two tasksnamely, that induction leads to higher rates of positive responding to novel test items than recognition.
As detailed below, we argue that there are a number of possible explanations for this difference between induction and recognition responses that cannot be differentiated on the basis of decision data alone. Hence, the comparison of induction and recognition tasks offers an additional opportunity to illustrate how modeling dynamic responding can lead to theoretical advances that cannot be achieved through the analysis of decision data alone.
A Sequential Sampling Approach to Induction and Recognition
The core assumption of sequential sampling models is that evidence about a test probe is gradually accumulated from the test environment until sufficient evidence has been collected to inform a decision (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2005 , 2008 Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998; Usher & McClelland, 2001; Van Zandt, Colonius, & Proctor, 2000 ; for a review, see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) . Although sequential sampling models differ in their specific assumptions, most assume that at least three key parameters affect decisions and/or decision latency: (a) the average rate of information accumulation, referred to as the drift rate; (b) the amount of evidence required to trigger a response, known as the decision threshold; and (c) the time taken for components of the response that are outside the decision process itself, such as encoding the stimulus and executing a response (Ratcliff & Smith, 2004) . Such models have successfully explained patterns of dynamic decision making in recognition (e.g., Rae et al., 2014; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & Starns, 2013; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004) , perceptual discrimination (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) , and lexical decision (e.g., Heathcote & Hayes, 2012; Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004) .
Our first aim was to develop a sequential sampling model that could explain dynamic decision making in induction as well as in recognition. As detailed below, we used the linear ballistic accumulator (LBA; Brown & Heathcote, 2008) architecture that has been successfully applied to dynamic decision making in both binary choice tasks (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Ludwig, Farrell, Ellis, & Gilchrist, 2009; Nosofsky, Cao, Cox, & Shiffrin, 2014) and more complex decisions (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2014a Hawkins et al., , 2014b Jones, Hawkins, & Brown, 2015; Trueblood, Brown, & This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. . The LBA is a sequential sampling model where each response alternative (e.g., yes and no in response to the question of whether a property generalizes to a test probe) is represented in a separate evidence accumulator. It shares many of the key parameters found in other sequential sampling models (e.g., drift rate, threshold for making decisions, nondecision time). However, it has some notable advantages, including model simplicity, containing fewer parameters than many other sequential sampling models (cf. Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Usher & McClelland, 2001 ), and closed-form solutions that allow for simple extension to hierarchical Bayesian approaches to parameter estimation.
The next section outlines the core assumptions of a new exemplar-based LBA model. The most novel feature of this model is that it incorporates a method for assessing the similarity between old and new items that can be applied in both induction and recognition data. Experiment 1 tested the model by applying it to both decisions and response times in property induction and recognition tasks. The model was further tested in a second experiment that examined time pressure effects in the form of task instructions that emphasized the speed or accuracy of responding in induction and recognition judgments.
An LBA Model of Induction and Recognition
The LBA is a sequential sampling model where each choice alternative (e.g., a yes or no response to the question of whether a probe shares a property with known category members) is represented by a separate evidence accumulator. As in other sequential sampling models, the LBA assumes that evidence gathers in each accumulator according to a drift rate parameter, v, which represents the strength of evidence favoring each response option. When the evidence in one accumulator reaches a prespecified criterion amount-the decision threshold, b-a response is triggered. The accumulator that crossed the decision threshold determines the response, and the predicted response time is the time taken to reach the threshold plus a fixed offset (nondecision time, t 0 ), which accounts for the time required to encode the stimulus and make a motor response.
In sequential sampling models like the LBA, the drift rate is assumed to reflect the quality of the evidence that is accumulated. In the recognition-induction task we study here, this corresponds to the level of detail extracted in comparisons of the similarity of a probe to studied exemplars. For example, it may be the case that recognition requires consideration of more fine-grained similarity information (e.g., at the level of exemplar-specific features) than induction, which can be interpreted as recognition involving consideration of higher quality similarity information than induction. In contrast, the decision threshold parameter reflects the overall quantity or amount of evidence that is accumulated before a decision is made. Figure 1 gives an example of an LBA decision between yes and no response alternatives. In induction, yes would indicate that the test probe shares some novel property with known category members. In recognition, yes would indicate that a test probe was judged to be a previously studied item. The yes and no response options are represented as independent accumulators that race against each other. The horizontal axes represent the passage of time, and the vertical axes represent the quantity of evidence. At the beginning of a decision, the amount of evidence in each accumulator (the start point) varies independently across accumulators and randomly across trials, sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and A. Evidence is assumed to accumulate linearly, represented as the arrows within each accumulator. The rate of linear evidence accumulation on a particular trial is given by the drift rate, which is distributed according to a mean rate (v) that is assumed to have some random variation across accumulators and from decision to decision according to independent samples from a normal distribution, N (v, s) . A large drift rate gives a faster rise to threshold and a more likely decision outcome on average. The variability in drift rates across trials is assumed to reflect decision-to-decision fluctuations in extraneous factors such as attention and motivation.
Exemplar-Based Linear Ballistic Accumulation
A key assumption of our LBA implementation is that the mean similarity between test probes and studied exemplars determines the drift rate of the model. Evidence is accumulated for a yes or no response to a test item in proportion to the test item's total similarity to the set of studied items, which are assumed to be stored in memory as exemplars. In this way, we assume that exemplar similarity drives the linear and ballistic evidence accumulation process. Hence, we refer to this as the exemplar-based LBA (ex-LBA) model. The ex-LBA moves toward an explanation of the information used to drive decisions because the drift rates of the model are constrained through the similarity relations among items rather than estimating independent drift rate parameters for different experimental conditions (cf. Nosofsky et al., 2014 , for a related exemplar-based LBA model applied to visual search data).
The ex-LBA model is conceptually similar to previous models that have incorporated exemplar-based representations into decision models-namely, the exemplar-based random walk (EBRW) model (Cohen & Nosofsky, 2003; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) -an extension of the generalized context model (GCM; Nosofsky, 1986) . In some respects, our use of an ex-LBA model to examine the processes that underlie induction and recognition processes has parallels in work comparing the processes involved in category learning and recognition. A considerable body of evidence suggests that both recognition and categorization performance can be explained with an exemplar-based processing model such as the GCM (Nosofsky, 1986; Nosofsky, Little, & James, 2012; Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998 This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Although there are some parallels between the current work and that of Nosofsky and colleagues (e.g., 1986 Nosofsky and colleagues (e.g., , 1998 Nosofsky and colleagues (e.g., , 2012 , there are also notable differences between the approaches. First, it is important to note that although there is a strong empirical relation between categorization and category-based induction (e.g., Rehder & Burnett, 2005; Rehder & Hastie, 2004) , the two tasks are not isomorphic. For example, property induction decisions are most strongly influenced by the typical features shared by members of a given category, whereas categorization decisions give more weight to features that differentiate the members of contrasting categories (Sweller & Hayes, 2010; Yamauchi & Markman, 1998) . Second, our modeling goes further by examining the processes that underlie both decision and response time data in ostensibly different cognitive tasks. Finally, the EBRW assumes that the GCM similarity equations drive a random walk decision process, which by definition produces discretized distributions of decision times. This can be problematic when the decision boundaries are close to the starting point of evidence accumulation and require convolution with the nondecision time distribution to smooth the predicted distribution of response times. In contrast, the LBA has the advantage of being continuous rather than discrete and has analytic solutions that allow simple extension to hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation.
Although we see a strong theoretical rationale for using an LBA-based approach to modeling decisions and response times in induction and recognition, model implementation in this context represents a significant technical challenge. In previous work, the LBA and related sequential sampling models have often been applied to very large data sets made up of hundreds to thousands of individual responses to test stimuli. Such data sets allow for efficient and robust parameter recovery, and fitting sequential sampling models to fewer trials per participant can introduce systematic biases due to correlations between model parameters (e.g., Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002; Voss, Nagler, & Lerche, 2013 ). In the current work, the total number of available test items was constrained (a total of 80 test stimuli presented in a given block). To compensate for the smaller data sets, we therefore employed a hierarchical Bayesian approach to parameter estimation (cf. Lee, 2008 Lee, , 2011 . The hierarchical Bayesian approach provides a coherent and efficient method to both generate data and make inferences about the parameters of the data-generating process, with relatively few observations per participant.
Experiment 1
To test the ex-LBA model, we extended the common induction and recognition paradigm developed by Heit and Hayes (2011) to include measurement of response latencies for test phase induction and recognition decisions. Participants were presented with study instances from a single category (large dogs) and were then asked to make timed binary decisions about a test set containing both old and new items. This common stimulus set was presented under either induction or recognition instructions to different groups. Those given recognition instructions judged whether each test item had been studied in the previous phase. Those given induction instructions judged whether each test item shared a novel property with the studied set.
Ex-LBA modeling of decisions and response times addressed two core questions. First, could the model provide a coherent and accurate account of decisions and response times in induction as well as recognition? Second, in what respects (if any) did the processing parameters of the model differ between induction and recognition?
One salient difference between induction and recognition responding found in previous work (Hayes & Heit, 2013a; Heit & Hayes, 2011) is that the rate of yes responding to novel test items is higher under induction than recognition instructions. We expected to replicate this finding. Note, however, that this decision pattern could be the end result of one of a number of different dynamic processes. One possibility is that recognition and induction involve the accumulation of the same quality of similaritybased information but that induction has a lower decision threshold for responding than recognition. In other words, a smaller quantity of similarity-based evidence is considered or collected before a yes response is made in induction than recognition. If no other parameters differ, this approach leads to the prediction that yes responses will generally be more frequent and faster in induction than recognition. If this proved to be the case, then induction could be viewed as a less cautious version of recognition. We refer to this as the quantity account.
Alternatively, the two tasks might involve similar levels of caution but require the accumulation of different types of similarity-based evidence. Under this hypothesis, a lower quality of similarity-based evidence would be required to elicit a yes response in induction, leading to more variable decisions and response times than in recognition; we refer to this as the quality account. This would indicate that property generalization is less sensitive to the similarity relations between the probe and studied items than recognizing a previously studied item. A third possibility is that recognition and induction may differ in both their level of response caution and the quality of evidence accumulated before a decision is made (cf. Criss, 2010; Rae et al., 2014) .
It could be argued that these contrasting theoretical accounts about the common and distinctive processes underlying induction and recognition could be elucidated with a response deadline. In response deadline procedures, stimulus processing is interrupted at some experimenter-defined time poststimulus onset (i.e., the response deadline) after which a response must be provided as quickly as possible. This procedure has a long history in the literature, particularly in the study of induction and recognition. Although it has been argued to provide a purer measure of the quality of information driving decisions, it cannot resolve debates between quality versus quantity: The response deadline procedure shifts the quantity of evidence used to inform a decision from the control of the decision maker to the experimenter.
In contrast, sequential sampling models applied to subjectcontrolled response procedures have proved useful in resolving debates between quality versus quantity of evidence accounts in a range of other domains. For example, with age, recognition responses become slower but remain accurate. Ratcliff, Thapar, and McKoon (2004) demonstrated that such data are well explained by a sequential sampling model in which sensitivity to factors affecting the quality of evidence (e.g., frequency of study item presentation) remain age invariant but the quantity of evidence required to trigger a decision increases with age.
Notably, the competing quantity and quality interpretations of differences between induction and recognition responding cannot be differentiated based on an analysis of decision data alone. To This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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demonstrate, we fit two versions of the ex-LBA to the decision data from Experiment 1a of Heit and Hayes (2011) , where response time data were not collected. The two models correspond to the quality (changes in the generalization gradient) and quantity (changes in decision caution) theories. A third account-representing quality ϩ quantity (i.e., a combination of the generalization and caution accounts)-can simply be thought of as a mixture of the outcome of the first two models. All details of the hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation from the ex-LBA model are provided in Appendix A. The two versions of the ex-LBA model provided an excellent account of the primary pattern in Heit and Hayes's (2011) decision data; the proportion of yes responding was greater under induction than recognition instructions. This is shown in the posterior predictive distributions in the upper panel of Figure 2 , which tell us what data to expect from the model once it has been updated with the observed data, shown as the shaded density regions overlaid on the mean proportion of positive responses. The upper panel shows that the quality and quantity theories implemented in the ex-LBA model provide an equally good account of the decision data. Both models have the same number of parameters that were freely estimated from the data; conventional model selection indices therefore cannot discriminate between the two competing theories. However, the parameter estimates of the two models would lead one to different theoretical conclusions. The quality account indicates that recognition is more sensitive to the similarity relations among items than induction, but the two types of judgments are made with equivalent levels of caution. The quantity account, in contrast, indicates that induction and recognition are equally sensitive to similarity information but that recognition has a higher threshold for responding, suggesting that induction is a less cautious version of recognition.
We can use the parameters estimated from the ex-LBA fit to Heit and Hayes's (2011) data to simulate response time predictions from the two accounts. The two theories-weaker similarity generalization or shifts in response caution-predict qualitatively distinct patterns of response times-shown as response time distributions in the second and third panels of Figure 2 . Specifically, the quantity account predicts that positive responses under induction (green lines) will have a faster leading edge (i.e., the start of the response time distribution) than negative responses (red lines); the quality account predicts similar speed and variance for positive and negative responses. For recognition instructions, the quality account predicts a more peaked (i.e., less variable) distribution of negative responses than the quantity account. The lower panels of Figure 2 contrast the response time predictions more precisely by plotting the predicted distribution of positive and negative responses from induction against recognition; this plot provides a qualitative target for our experimental data. The quantity theory will receive more support if the distribution of positive responses is faster under induction than recognition but with similar variance; the distribution falls completely below, but is otherwise parallel to, the diagonal line. In contrast, the quality theory will receive more support if the distribution of response times for positive responses is equal under induction and recognition and negative responses that are more variable under induction; the green line falls on the diagonal, and the red line grows further along the y-axis than the x-axis. Of course, the best account of the data may come from a mixture of the quality and quantity theories, Figure 2 . Exemplar-based LBA model goodness of fit to decision data and predicted response time distributions for Experiment 1a of Heit and Hayes (2011) . The left and right columns show the quality and quantity theories, respectively. The upper panel shows the mean proportion of positive responses for the reasoning (y-axis) and memory (x-axis) conditions. Data are shown as symbols, where crosses and open circles represent old and new items, respectively, and color represents the proportion of positive responses from pure red (all negative responses) through to pure green (all positive responses). The dashed y ϭ x identity line indicates where responses would lie if they were identically distributed in both conditions. Posterior predictive distributions of the exemplar-based LBA model are shown as shaded density regions, with higher density regions shown with darker shading. The lower three panels show predicted response time distributions of the two accounts. Positive and negative responses are shown in solid green and dashed red lines, respectively. The second and third panels show predicted response time density curves separately for the reasoning and memory conditions. The lower panel shows quantiles of the predicted response time distributions for the reasoning (y-axis) and memory (x-axis) conditions. Dots indicate the 10th, 30th, 50th (i.e., median), 70th, and 90th percentiles of the distribution of response times. See the online article for the color version of this figure. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
which would be realized as a mixture of the response time distribution predictions described here. This simulation makes it clear that the competing theories can only be differentiated through consideration of the joint distribution of decisions and response times. Our modeling approach, detailed below, will provide a clear test of these different accounts by allowing us to compute and compare the relevant processing parameters in each task.
Method
Participants. One hundred undergraduate psychology students from the University of New South Wales participated in exchange for course credit. Equal numbers were randomly allocated to the recognition and induction conditions. All participants were tested in individual cubicles.
In addition, a large sample was recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; N ϭ 637) to produce old-new similarity ratings for test items. Participation was restricted to respondents from the United States who had at least a 90% approval rating for their previous MTurk work. MTurk participants were each paid $0.50 US for ratings that were usually completed within 15 min (M COMPLETION ϭ 14 min 56 s).
Materials and deriving old-new similarity ratings. The stimulus set consisted of 80 color photographs of dogs adapted from Internet images created by the American Kennel Club (2013). Each photograph showed a dog in a standing, left-facing position, 300 ϫ 300 pixels in size. We allocated photographs of 20 large dogs to comprise the study set, and an additional 60 photographs were used for the test set.
An important component of our ex-LBA modeling was the use of old-new item similarity as the basis for determining the drift rate parameter for test phase decisions. Each member of the MTurk sample completed 160 ratings of the similarity of study items to test items (Appendix B provides details of this pretesting). These data were aggregated across participants to give the mean similarity of the 20 study items to each of the 80 test items (20 old items ϩ 60 novel items). This produced a much broader similarity space among items than previously studied in this paradigm (1,600 study-test similarity comparisons compared to 450 in Heit & Hayes, 2011) . As expected, old items were generally rated as most similar to study items, and the 60 new items for the test set demonstrated a smooth gradation from some overlap with the study items through to highly dissimilar from the study items (see Figure B1 in Appendix B for details).
Procedure. In the recognition condition, participants were instructed that they would see multiple study-test cycles where they were to memorize the list of study items for a subsequent recognition test. Participants were shown the 20 study items with the order randomized across blocks and participants, presented for 2 s at a time with a .5-s interstimulus interval. The presentation of each study item was accompanied with the text "Remember these animals." After the study phase, participants observed a 60-s unfilled retention interval and were instructed about the upcoming test phase. Participants were asked to judge whether they had previously studied each of the (80) test items and to respond yes with the z key and no with the / key, emphasizing both decision speed and accuracy. Each test item was accompanied with the query "Did you see this animal in the STUDY phase?" and remained on screen until a response was entered. Each response was followed by a 1-s interval prior to the presentation of the next test item. The order of the 80 test items was randomized across blocks and participants. All participants completed 320 test trials broken into four study-test cycles each containing 80 test trials. The same set of study and test items were used across the four study-test cycles.
The induction condition was the same as the recognition condition in all respects except for the following. Prior to the study phase, participants were instructed that they would see animals that had a property known as beta cells and that they were to learn which animals had beta cells. The presentation of each item in the study phase was accompanied with the text "These animals have beta cells." During the poststudy retention interval, participants were instructed that they would see a list of items (the test list), and they were asked to judge whether these items had the same property (beta cells) as the study list. The text accompanying each test item queried "Does this animal have beta cells?"
Results
Although participants completed four blocks of 80 test trials, our analysis and ex-LBA modeling focused on the first block of trials (80 data points per participant). This ensured maximal differentiation between the effects of induction and recognition instructions and greater comparability to the findings of previous studies (e.g., Heit & Hayes, 2011) where participants completed only a single study-test block.
To facilitate analysis of response times, we implemented a two-stage procedure to exclude outlying trials. First, we removed any extreme outliers, which we considered to be responses faster than .25 s or slower than 10 s (2.04% of total trials). We additionally excluded from all subsequent analyses four participants who had more than 20% of their trials identified as extreme outliers (three induction, one recognition) and one participant who misunderstood task instructions (rapidly responded yes to every test item). Of the 95 participants who were included in analysis, we dropped outlier trials using a per-participant criterion: A response was considered an outlier if it was slower than 3 standard deviations from the participant's mean response time. Of the participants included in the analysis, we removed a total of 2.38% of trials, with no apparent differences in exclusion rates between conditions (induction: 2.31% vs. recognition: 2.45%) or as a function of study-test similarity (range in exclusion rate across the 80 items: 0%-4.95%).
We first provide a descriptive overview of the proportion of positive responses at test and mean response times. We then outline the development of the ex-LBA cognitive model that simultaneously considers the decisions and response time distributions in the data.
Positive test responses. The mean proportion of positive (yes) test responses as a function of similarity to studied items is shown in the upper panels of Figure 3 . The upper left and upper middle panels show that the mean proportion of positive responses for the 80 test items generally increased as a sigmoidal function of study-test item similarity in both the induction and recognition conditions. Positive response rates were high for all old items (shown as crosses) in both conditions (induction: M ϭ .90, SE ϭ .02 and recognition: M ϭ .86, SE ϭ .02), This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
t(93) ϭ 1.28, p ϭ .20, indicating that participants reliably identified the study items and could use them to render property generalization judgments. There was a lower overall proportion of positive responses in recognition compared to induction (M ϭ .38, SE ϭ .02 and M ϭ .48, SE ϭ .02, respectively), t(93) ϭ 4.05, p Ͻ .001, shown in Figure 3 as a rightward shift in the data points along the x-axis. The relationship between test responding in the recognition and induction conditions is shown in the upper right panel of Figure 3 . This figure shows the mean proportion of positive test responses from the induction condition (y-axis) plotted against the recognition condition (x-axis). The height of the symbols above the diagonal y ϭ x line indicates the extent to which those doing induction were more likely to respond positively (i.e., generalize the novel property) than those doing recognition (i.e., false alarm for new items, shown as circles). The majority of data points fell above the identity line (70 of 80 test items), which is consistent with greater generalization from study to test items in the induction condition compared to the recognition condition and is reliable by binomial test, p Ͻ .001, 95% CI [.78, .94 ]. Nevertheless, there was a strong positive relationship between test responding in recognition and induction, r ϭ This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Both the induction and recognition conditions were strongly influenced by item similarity: Items with relatively low or high similarity to studied items had faster mean latencies than items with intermediate similarity. This effect was confirmed with the finding that a second-order polynomial provided a much better account of the relationship than a linear model, according to nested model likelihood ratio tests, for both tasks-induction: R 2 ϭ .50 versus R 2 ϭ .03, 2 (1) ϭ 53.1, p Ͻ .001, recognition: R 2 ϭ .65 versus R 2 ϭ .29, 2 (1) ϭ 56.1, p Ͻ .001. Summary of experimental findings. The pattern of decisions in induction and recognition was generally similar to that obtained in a number of related studies (e.g., Hayes, Fritz, & Heit, 2013; Heit & Hayes, 2011) . Those in the induction condition made more positive responses to test items than those doing recognition. Nevertheless, old-new similarity had a similar effect on response patterns in each condition, and overall there was a very strong empirical relationship between recognition and induction responses. Hence, this study replicated patterns of similarity and difference between memory and reasoning responding using a large stimulus set that covered a broader range of old-new similarity than previously examined.
An important novel feature of this study was the comparison of response times between inductive reasoning and recognition memory. Response times in each condition were affected in similar ways by old-new similarity. However, reasoning and memory differed in the relative speed of positive and negative responses. In the induction condition, people were faster to accept a test item that shared a property with the studied items than in rejecting the property generalization. In contrast, in the recognition condition, people were faster at deciding that a test item was not one of those presented at study than in making a positive response. This result is shown more completely, as full response time distributions, in Figure 4 . The relative speed of the distributions of positive and negative responses is diagnostic, at a qualitative level, of the processes underlying performance in the task: The aggregate response time distributions observed in Experiment 1 are qualitatively consistent with the quantity theory shown in Figure 2 , where the distribution of positive responses is faster under induction than recognition instructions. At a minimum, this finding suggests that the amount of evidence required to trigger a positive response is likely to differ between induction and recognition.
In the next section, we examine these tentative conclusions in a more rigorous and coherent way through application of the ex-LBA model. We use the model to draw deeper conclusions about the common and distinctive psychological processes underlying performance in the induction and recognition conditions.
A Process Model of Decisions and Response Times in Induction and Recognition
We now develop a cognitive model to account for the dependence between decisions and response times in inductive reasoning and recognition memory. We used a hierarchical Bayesian framework for our modeling to take advantage of the rich similarity data and to allow for efficient parameter estimation from relatively few data points per participant. We first specified a plausible generating model based on exemplar similarity. Once specified, we reversed the statistical process to infer parameters of the generative model and draw conclusions about the data using the hierarchical Bayesian framework. This approach allowed us to draw population-level inferences about commonalities and differences between reasoning and memory and also account for subject-level individual differences.
Bayesian Model-Based Analysis of the Ex-LBA
Our sequential sampling model assumes that study-test item similarity determines the drift rates that drive the evidence accumulation process, which leads to predictions for decisions and distributions of response times. We assume that the distance between items in psychological space is transformed to a measure of perceived similarity, or the familiarity, of those items, and that this forms the drift rates for the decision process. This is a constrained modeling approach that uses a single parameter (sensitivity to distance in psychological space, c, which controls the generalization gradient) to generate a unique drift rate for each of the 80 unique test items. The only prerequisite for our individual-item approach to sequential sampling models is a distance metric between items and a function to transform those distances to drift rate parameters.
We estimated the following ex-LBA model parameters: the sensitivity parameter, which influences the quality of similarity-based information accumulation for positive and negative responses; the maximum value of the start point of evidence accumulation; separate decision thresholds for positive and negative responses, which represent the quantity of information required to make a decision; trial-totrial variability in drift rates; and nondecision time. The model parameters were estimated at both the subject and population levels within a hierarchical Bayesian framework. This allowed us to estimate the group effect of the induction and recognition instructions on task performance without averaging data across participants. Complete details of the ex-LBA model, parameter estimation routines, and an analysis of variability in parameters across participants are provided in Appendix A.
Ex-LBA fit to Experiment 1 data. The ex-LBA model provided an excellent account of the decision and mean response time This result is shown more completely-as defective cumulative response time distributions-in Figure 5 . A defective distribution function is a distribution that is not normalized to 1 but, rather, to the probability of its associated response. The four panels for each instruction condition are composed of evenly sized bins of 20 test items grouped from low to high study-test item similarity (left to right, respectively), such that as one shifts from the left to right panels, the probability of a positive response (green lines) increases and the probability of a negative response (red lines) decreases. We binned responses to obtain a representative shape of the response time distribution for different levels of similarity, since each participant saw each test item only once. Figure 5 shows that, for both tasks, the ex-LBA provided an excellent account of the shape of the response time distributions and the probability of a positive response as a function of similarity. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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than recognition, indicating that less evidence was required to trigger a positive induction response. We can summarize the main findings of the ex-LBA modeling in terms of odds (for a similar approach, see Mittner et al., 2014) . Odds are computed as x/(1 Ϫ x), where x is the probability that a sample from one distribution is larger than a sample from another distribution. We use odds to indicate the relative likelihood of a difference between memory and reasoning parameter estimates as compared with the likelihood that there was no difference. We report the odds derived from the posterior distribution of the difference in each ex-LBA parameter (e.g., sensitivity, decision threshold) for the recognition condition minus the induction condition, such that a positive value indicates that recognition had a larger value of the parameter (see the lower panel of Figure 6 ). Here, we interpret odds of 10 or more, equivalently odds less than 0.1, as meaningful. This corresponds to over 90% of the distribution of the difference between model parameters based on the task conditions being above zero.
For example, 95.7% of the population-level distribution of the difference in the sensitivity parameter was above zero (see the lower left panel of Figure 6 ). In terms of odds, this implies that an effect of induction versus recognition on sensitivity has odds of 0.957/(1 Ϫ 0.957) ϭ 22.3:1; the sensitivity parameter was 22.3 times more likely to be increased under recognition compared to induction instructions, indicating a narrower generalization gradient for recognition. We also found a reliable effect of task on the amount of evidence required to trigger positive and negative responses. The recognition condition was over 1,000 times more likely to have a larger decision threshold for yes responses than induction (over 99.9% of mass above zero). A similar result held for no responses, where the recognition condition was 19 times more likely to have a larger decision threshold for negative responses than induction. Therefore, although we found evidence for a difference between induction and recognition on the three primary ex-LBA parameters, the strongest effect of task instruction (i.e., largest odds) was clearly on the amount of evidence required to trigger a positive response.
As both the positive and negative decision thresholds were larger for recognition than induction, this implies that induction generally involved a lower level of response caution than recognition. However, the result with decision thresholds can also be recast as a difference between the thresholds for negative and positive responses within each instruction condition: The positive threshold was over 1,000 times more likely to be larger than the negative threshold for recognition instructions (greater than 99.9% of the distribution of differences greater than zero), but not for induction (with a factor of 0.258, or 20.5% of the distribution of differences greater than zero, indicating only very weak evidence that the negative threshold was larger than the positive threshold). This result implies that the recognition condition was biased to give no compared to yes responses, but there was no evidence that the induction condition demonstrated any systematic response bias. The main task differences persisted in a weakened form after practice. That is, when we modeled the data from the final block of Experiment 1 rather than the first, we found evidence for effects in the same direction as for the primary analysis that focused on the first block, except weaker (sensitivity with a factor of 8.4, positive threshold with a factor of 28.6, and little evidence for an effect of the negative threshold, with a factor of 2.7). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
The remaining model parameters produced no findings of broad significance. There was no reliable difference between conditions in the maximum value of the start point of evidence accumulation (odds of 0.298 that recognition was greater than induction). We summarize the ex-LBA parameters that were not estimated separately across task conditions with the 95% highest density interval (HDI; Kruschke, 2011) -the smallest interval to contain 95% of the marginal posterior density of a parameter. The parameter estimates that were common to both conditions were in a plausible range: nondecision time (95% HDI [.25, .28] ) and the standard deviation of the trial-to-trial variability in the drift rate (95% HDI [.29, .32] ). The population variance parameters did not differ as a function of task condition.
Discussion
This experiment tested a novel sequential sampling model of decision dynamics in inductive reasoning and recognition. A hierarchical Bayesian approach to model fitting found that the ex-LBA model provided an excellent account of all key qualitative and quantitative patterns in decision and response time data in both tasks. This suggests that the ex-LBA model is a viable candidate model of induction and recognition. Sequential sampling models have previously been used to explain how recognition decisions are made over time (e.g., Rae et al., 2014; Ratcliff & Starns, 2013; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004) . This is the first time, however, that such a model has been used to explain dynamic decision making in inductive reasoning.
In addition to offering a new theoretical framework for examining induction, our application of the ex-LBA model allowed for a fine-grained comparison of the processes involved in induction and recognition. In particular, our modeling provided a more nuanced view of the similarities and differences between induction and recognition than was possible without a model of decisions and response times. Relative to induction, recognition decisions involved greater caution overall (larger positive and negative decision thresholds), and more evidence was required to trigger a positive compared to a negative response (the no threshold was lower than the yes threshold). This finding indicates that recognition instructions might lead to a bias for negative (new) over positive (old) responses. In contrast, inductive judgments appear to require less evidence to trigger a positive or negative response and no systematic bias to accept or reject a property generalization.
Additionally, induction was less sensitive than recognition to the similarity-based information underlying the decision process (i.e., lower value of the sensitivity parameter), although this effect was weaker than that found for the positive decision threshold. This suggests that recognition involved consideration of finer-grained similarity information between the study and test items.
These findings represent a novel advance on previous work that found differences between the rate of positive responding to novel items in induction and recognition (e.g., Hayes et al., 2013; Heit & Hayes, 2011) . In the absence of response time data, such decision patterns could be explained by a number of different dynamic mechanisms. Our modeling shows that the best explanation assumes that the tasks primarily differ in the quantity of information used to make a response (the decision threshold) and a smaller contribution from the quality of similarity-based information that drives judgments (the generalization gradient).
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 is the first study to collect both decision and response time data in induction and recognition and to explain these data using a sequential sampling model. A key finding was that induction differed from recognition in both the quantity and quality of similarity-based information used to make decisions, although the quantity effect was larger. Experiment 2 followed up on these results in two ways. First, we aimed to further validate the ex-LBA model by testing it under conditions that should systematically alter the model parameters in predictable ways (instructions emphasizing either the speed or accuracy of responding). Second, we sought to advance understanding of how inductive reasoning changes under time pressure by examining changes in the quantity and quality of information used for inductive judgments under speed or accuracy conditions.
Many studies have examined speed or accuracy emphases on decisions and response latencies with sequential sampling models in recognition memory (e.g., Rae et al., 2014; Starns & Ratcliff, 2010) , perceptual discrimination (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2011; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998) , and lexical decision (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2008; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2008) , among many others. The general finding is that emphasizing response accuracy over response speed increases the accuracy of decisions, as expected, but at the expense of slower responses. This empirical pattern, known as the speed-accuracy trade-off, is well described by setting a larger decision threshold for accuracy emphasis trials relative to speed emphasis trials. A minority of studies have found an additional effect on the quality of information as indexed by drift rates with time pressure leading to a reduction in the quality of information accumulated (e.g., Rae et al., 2014; Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Lee, 2008) . Hence, we expected that emphasizing speed would lead to a reduction in decision thresholds in both recognition and induction and possibly reduced sensitivity to similarity information. This affords a stronger test of the Experiment 1 finding that recognition involves more cautious responding than induction. It is important to see if this task difference persists when responses are made under time pressure and decision thresholds for recognition are reduced.
Only a handful of studies have previously examined how time pressure affects inductive reasoning (e.g., Bright & Feeney, 2014; Hayes & Heit, 2013a; Shafto et al., 2007) . A notable finding from this work is that the type of information used as a basis for induction appears to change as a function of decision time. Shafto et al. (2007) , for example, found that inferences made under short response deadlines were based on superficial (taxonomic) similarity between study and test items but that more abstract similarity relations (e.g., shared habitat) were also considered when more decision time was available. Bright and Feeney (2014, Experiment 1) derived three dissociable measures of premise-conclusion relations: associative, based on the frequency of the co-occurrence of premise and conclusion items; taxonomic; and causal. Associative knowledge predicted inductive generalization ratings when people were encouraged to respond quickly, but not when they responded slowly. Taxonomic and causal knowledge were better predictors of slow inductive ratings, although their relative contributions depended on the type of property that was being generalized.
These results could be seen to imply that the quality of information used for induction changes over time. However, as argued This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
previously, without collecting and modeling response time data, it is difficult to differentiate changes in responding based on information quality from changes based on the quantity of accumulated information. Our goal, therefore, was to examine whether changes in inductive judgments when accuracy is emphasized over speed are best explained by increases in the quality (sensitivity parameter) or quantity (decision threshold) of information accumulated or by changes in both parameters. Note that unlike Shafto et al. (2007) and Bright and Feeney (2014) , we examined this question within a single conceptual space (dogs) and in the context of generalizing a single abstract property (beta cells). This allowed us to capitalize on the extensive mapping of similarity relations for these stimuli from Experiment 1, allowing us to track changes in both the quantity and quality of similarity-based information under speed and accuracy conditions.
Method
Participants. Two hundred undergraduate psychology students from the University of New South Wales participated in exchange for course credit. Approximately equal numbers were randomly allocated to the induction and recognition conditions. Design and procedure. All experimental materials and the procedure were the same as those in Experiment 1 except for the following. In both the recognition and induction conditions, the four study-test cycles were split into two speed emphasis blocks and two accuracy emphasis blocks. Speed and accuracy blocks alternated for each participant (speed, accuracy, speed, accuracy or accuracy, speed, accuracy, speed), with the two orderings counterbalanced across participants.
The recognition and induction instructions provided to different participant groups were the same as those in Experiment 1. Prior to beginning any of the study-test cycles, participants were instructed that some blocks would emphasize decision speed and others would emphasize accuracy. In each block, participants were given instructions about the relevant emphasis (speed or accuracy) during the 60-s interval between the study and test phases. The respective instructions were: "This is a SPEED test phase. Please respond as quickly and accurately as possible on each trial. Don't worry if you make some incorrect decisions, but try to make as many correct responses as you can" and "This is an ACCURACY test phase. Please respond as accurately as possible on each trial. Don't worry if you take a long time to decide, just try to make a careful decision." During each test phase, a reminder message was constantly displayed at the top of the display in a bolded and bordered box to emphasize the current response style: "This is a SPEED test: BE FAST" (in green font) or "This is an ACCURACY test: BE ACCURATE" (in red font).
Results and Discussion
We used the same two-stage procedure to exclude outlying trials as in Experiment 1. We identified 1.55% of trials as extreme outliers and removed these from analysis (responses faster than .25 s or slower than 10 s) and additionally excluded six participants (four induction, two recognition) who had more than 20% of their trials identified as extreme outliers and two participants who misunderstood task instructions (rapidly responded yes to every decision trial). Of the 192 participants who were included in the analysis, we identified and dropped outlier trials that were slower than 3 standard deviations from the participant's mean response time. This removed a total of 2.84% of trials, with no apparent differences in exclusion rates between conditions (induction: 2.68% vs. recognition: 2.99%). All analyses and ex-LBA modeling focused on the first block of trials (80 data points per participant, approximately 48 participants per condition). Half of these were speed emphasis blocks; half were accuracy emphasis blocks. This focus on the first block allowed maximum comparability to Experiment 1 and avoided the potential confound of contamination of switching response style by alternating instructions to emphasize speed or accuracy when performance in the task environment is not well practiced.
Positive test responses. The mean proportion of positive responses at test for the speed and accuracy conditions is shown in the upper two panels of Figure 7 . The general trends were highly similar to those in Experiment 1: The rate of positive responses generally increased as a sigmoidal function of study-test item similarity (left and middle columns), and the induction condition had a greater mean rate of positive responses relative to recognition, M ϭ .43, SE ϭ .01, and M ϭ .37, SE ϭ .01, respectively; F(1, 188) ϭ 12.26, p Ͻ .001. The rate of positive responding did not differ as a function of speed or accuracy emphasis, nor was there an interaction between speed or accuracy emphasis and task (both ps Ͼ .1).
As in Experiment 1, when the proportion of positive responses in the induction condition was plotted against the recognition condition, the large majority of the data points fell above the identity line for speed emphasis instructions (65 of (1) ϭ 7.4, p ϭ .005. Despite the statistically reliable effect, we note that the support for the secondorder polynomial over the simple linear model was smaller under accuracy emphasis compared to speed emphasis. Taken together, the analyses suggest that there is a larger difference in the rates of positive responding between induction and recognition when decision speed is emphasized rather than decision accuracy.
Response times. The lower two panels of Figure 7 show mean response times for all 80 test items as a function of study-test item similarity. Visual inspection suggests that the induction and recognition conditions had similar mean response times across both the speed and accuracy instructions. A 2 (task condition: recognition, induction) ϫ 2 (emphasis: speed, accuracy) ϫ 2 (response: positive, negative) mixed-factor ANOVA on mean response times indicated a strong main effect of emphasis, where responses were much faster on average when speed was emphasized compared to accuracy, M ϭ .69 s, SE ϭ .02 versus M ϭ 1.04 s, SE ϭ .03; F(1, 188) ϭ 91.34, p Ͻ .001. No other main or interaction effects were reliable (all ps Ͼ .09).
As in Experiment 1, there was a strong relationship between mean response time and item similarity. In all four conditions, a secondorder polynomial provided a better account of the relationship than a This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Bayesian Model-Based Analysis of the Ex-LBA
We estimated parameters from the ex-LBA model using methods identical to those described in Experiment 1 and Appendix A. The only difference was a model modification to account for a speedaccuracy trade-off manipulation by allowing for a separate sensitivity parameter and a separate set of decision thresholds for positive and negative responses in the speed and accuracy conditions. Therefore, the induction and recognition conditions each had four threshold parameters-positive response for speed emphasis, negative response for speed emphasis, positive response for accuracy emphasis, and negative response for accuracy emphasis-and two sensitivity parameters-one for speed emphasis and another for accuracy emphasis. No other model parameters were free to vary across the speed and accuracy conditions, as we had no a priori reason to suspect that they would differ with this manipulation.
Ex-LBA fit to Experiment 2 data and parameter estimates.
The ex-LBA model again provided an excellent account of the decision and mean response time data, as shown in Figure 7 , and the full distribution of response times, as shown in Figure 8 . Figure 9 shows the marginal posterior distributions of the population means for the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
primary ex-LBA parameters. Visual inspection indicates that the instructions to emphasize decision accuracy reliably increased the ex-LBA decision thresholds compared to instructions to emphasize response speed, as is the standard finding in the perceptual decisionmaking literature, and may have had some influence on sensitivity. We again calculated odds to examine parameter changes in the speed and accuracy conditions. We first summarize the effect of speed versus accuracy emphasis on induction and recognition separately, followed by a comparison between task conditions. In recognition, the sensitivity parameter was 34.5 times more likely to be larger in accuracy than the speed blocks. In contrast, there was no reliable difference in sensitivity between accuracy and speed blocks in induction (with a factor of 5.4 times; contrast the upper and lower panels of the left column of Figure 9 ). This result suggests that emphasizing the speed of responding systematically lowered sensitivity to the similarity among items, leading to a broader generalization gradient when making recognition decisions; a similar result regarding drift rates has been found in a minority of previous recognition studies (e.g., Rae et al., 2014) . However, the speed-accuracy instructions had little effect on the quality of the similarity-based information used for induction.
With regard to decision caution, we replicated the standard finding for speed-accuracy manipulations in the recognition and perceptual decision-making literature (e.g., Rae et al., 2014; Starns & Ratcliff, 2010) : a larger threshold for both positive and negative recognition responses for judgments emphasizing accuracy relative to speed. Notably, a similar shift in the decision threshold was found in the induction task (all odds greater than 1,000:1).
Hence, emphasizing the accuracy of property induction decisions over speed led people to accumulate more similarity-based information before making a response but did not affect the quality of that information. This suggests a new interpretation of previously reported effects of time pressure on inductive responding (e.g., Bright & Feeney, 2014; Shafto et al., 2007) . Such effects have generally been interpreted as involving shifts between differ- This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Reasoning Memory Figure 9 . Density curves of the marginal posterior distributions of the population-level mean parameters of the exemplar-based LBA model in Experiment 2. All other details are as described in Figure 6 . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. ent types of relations over the time course of inductive decisions. In contrast, our data suggest that when more decision time is available and accuracy is emphasized, a greater quantity of information is accumulated before a property induction decision is made. We return to this point in the General Discussion. With respect to differences between tasks, the sensitivity parameter was approximately 10 times more likely to be increased for recognition than induction when the speed of responding was emphasized. There was, however, no reliable evidence for a corresponding effect under accuracy emphasis (odds of only 2.8; left column of Figure 9 ). Most notably, under both speed and accuracy emphasis instructions, the quantity of similarity-based evidence used to make decisions again differed across tasks. The recognition condition was 11.2 (speed) and 14.9 (accuracy) times more likely to have a larger decision threshold for positive responses than induction. There was no consistent effect on the quantity of evidence required for a negative response (odds of 0.18 and 3.8 for speed and accuracy emphases, respectively).
There was no difference between recognition and induction in the maximum value of the start point of evidence accumulation (odds of .92). The parameters that were common to both tasks and speed and accuracy conditions were estimated in a similar range as in Experiment 1: Nondecision time (95% HDI [.21, .24]), the standard deviation of the trial-to-trial variability in the drift rate (95% HDI [.30, .32]) , and the population variance parameters did not differ as a function of the instruction condition.
In sum, under speed emphasis instructions, the pattern of task differences was broadly similar to that found in Experiment 1, with recognition involving both a greater quantity and quality of information than induction. Under accuracy emphasis instructions, the two tasks differed only in information quantity. These results highlight the robustness of the task difference in the decision threshold. The values of the threshold parameter for recognition in the speed condition (see Figure 9 ) were considerably lower than those obtained in Experiment 1 (see Figure 6 ). Nevertheless, even with this lower threshold, people in the recognition condition still accumulated more information than those in induction before making a decision. Moreover, when accuracy was emphasized, the two tasks differed only in the quantity of information accumulated.
General Discussion
These studies developed and applied a novel sequential sampling model to account for decision and response time data in induction and recognition. Like previous sequential sampling models using the LBA model architecture, our ex-LBA model was able to successfully model the key features in recognition data (e.g., Rae et al., 2014) . Crucially, however, the current studies are the first to measure and model decisions and response times in inductive reasoning. The dynamics of induction decisions were well explained by a sequential sampling process in which the rate of evidence accumulation was determined by the exemplar similarity between a test probe and previously studied category members.
Estimation of model parameters allowed us to examine the extent to which inductive reasoning differed from recognition memory in terms of the quality and quantity of information accumulated before a decision was made. The most important difference was in information quantity; both experiments found that less similarity-based information was collected before making inductive compared to recognition decisions. Experiment 1 and the speed condition of Experiment 2 also found some evidence of induction using a lower quality of similaritybased information than recognition.
Sequential sampling models have previously been applied to examine dynamic processes in recognition memory (e.g., Nosofsky et al., 2014; Rae et al., 2014; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff, Thapar, & McKoon, 2004 ) and a range of other higher level cognitive tasks (e.g., Hawkins et al., 2014b; Trueblood et al., 2014) . The current work shows that this approach can be successfully extended to explain how inductive inferences are made.
In many respects, the ex-LBA model offers a new way of thinking about the process of property induction. Like other models of induction (e.g., Osherson et al., 1990; Sloman, 1993) , it accords a central role to the similarity between known category members and test items. Unlike these models, however, it specifies how the relevant evidence for induction is accumulated over time and how other dynamic factors such as decision caution, response bias, and response variability affect property inferences. Hence, as in other cognitive domains such as recognition memory (e.g., Brown & Heathcote, 2005; Ratcliff, 1978) , simultaneously modeling response time and decision data has allowed us to propose and test a more fine-grained theory of inductive reasoning.
A possible reason why no previous work has attempted to apply a sequential sampling framework to induction is that many approaches to sequential sampling models require very large numbers of test decisions per participant for reliable parameter estimation. Such data sets are relatively easy to acquire in simple perceptual discrimination tasks but are problematic for more complex tasks like inductive reasoning, particularly when patterns of responding might change over time. We circumvented this problem with a hierarchical Bayesian approach for parameter estimation. Our hierarchical Bayesian modeling leveraged the relatively small number of trials from each of a relatively large number of participants to constrain population-level parameter estimates, which in turn provided mutual constraint on subject-level parameter estimates. This modeling approach will make it easier for other researchers in the field to apply sequential sampling approaches to reasoning data.
Relationship to Other Work Examining Temporal Factors in Induction
Although dynamic factors have been largely absent from previous theorizing in induction, a small number of studies have examined how inductive judgments change under varying decision deadlines (e.g., Bright & Feeney, 2014; Shafto et al., 2007 ). An important finding of this work is that when multiple relations exist between premise and conclusion items (e.g., associative, taxonomic, causal), the relative accessibility of these relations can change over time.
There are several important differences between the current work and these previous studies. First, unlike those studies, we did not attempt to separate out the contributions of different types of relations to inductive judgment. In the current paradigm, all study and test items belonged to the same highly familiar basic level, did not vary taxonomically, and all exemplars were instantiated with pictures. Given these constraints, we expect that the taxonomic and perceptual relations between the study and test items were the most salient relations to participants' inductive judgments.
A second important difference is that no previous studies have attempted to model decision and response time data with a view to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
separating out the influence of information quality and quantity on dynamic inductive judgments. Hence, conclusions such as "both associative and structured knowledge act as input to inductive reasoning" (Bright & Feeney, 2014 , p. 2090 ) remain somewhat ambiguous. Although one might expect that different types of evidence are accumulated depending on whether one is attending to the associative, taxonomic, or causal relations between premises and conclusions, other processes are also feasible. Using different types of knowledge in induction could also lead to shifts in the decision threshold-for example, where the use of multiple knowledge types leads one to be more cautious in decisions about property generalization. This argument is analogous to the quality versus quantity theories we discussed in relation to Heit and Hayes's (2011) decision data. The advantage of quantitative cognitive models, such as the ex-LBA, is that these various accounts can be explicitly tested against data. Clearly what is needed in future work is a paradigm that allows for the use of multiple different types of knowledge and that permits detailed modeling of how these contribute to the dynamic components of inductive judgments. Some progress on the first of these issues has already been made. For example, Hayes and Heit (2013a) developed a paradigm similar to the current experiments that used multiple types of relations between study and test items (perceptual, taxonomic, habitat). The relative salience of these relations was manipulated using different types of properties that had to be generalized. Notably, a modified version of Generalization from Examples (GEN-EX) that computed different types of old-new similarity (e.g., similarity with respect to taxonomy, similarity with respect to habitat) accounted for induction under both fast and slow response deadlines. A useful direction for future work will be to collect response time as well as decision data using a similar paradigm to examine how the parameters of the ex-LBA model change as different types of knowledge become available.
Using the Ex-LBA to Model Other Inductive Phenomena
The chief aim in the current studies was to demonstrate that the ex-LBA could account for both decision and response time data in induction as well as recognition. For the ex-LBA to be considered as a serious alternative to other induction models, however, it must also account for many of the standard induction phenomena explained by other models. We outline here how the ex-LBA model explains three such phenomena: premise-conclusion similarity, premise typicality, and premise monotonicity. Osherson et al. (1990) and many others (for review, see Hayes & Heit, 2013b) have shown that generalization of a novel property from one category member to another is a positive function of their similarity. This result is easily explained by the ex-LBA, as the property generalization gradient is assumed to be driven by the similarity of a test instance (the conclusion) to instances known to share the property (premise items).
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The ex-LBA can also explain why more typical category members promote stronger property generalization to other category members than less typical instances. By definition, typical instances have a higher mean similarity to other category members than atypical members (Rosch & Mervis, 1975) . Hence, the model predicts that any test item will have on average a smaller psychological distance to a typical instance known to have the target property than to an atypical instance. This leads to a larger drift rate and therefore a greater probability of property generalization.
The ex-LBA model also readily explains the monotonicity effect, where property generalization is a positive function of the number of instances known to have the target property. As the number of study instances known to have the target property increases, then this will generally result in a higher level of total similarity to a test item from the same category, assuming that item typicality is held constant across the smaller and larger sets. Another way to think of this is that the ex-LBA model computes drift rates by summing premiseconclusion similarity across items (i.e., number of premises), and summing a greater number of values will lead to a larger quantity on average.
We have outlined how the ex-LBA can qualitatively predict three inductive phenomena through similarity-based mechanisms. However, it is important to note that these phenomena, and others, could also arise through non-similarity-based mechanisms, analogous to the quality and quantity theories we discussed in relation to Heit and Hayes's (2011) decision data. For example, the premise monotonicity effect might also arise because a greater number of premises leads to a corresponding reduction in the threshold for yes responses, leading to a bias toward a generalization response. It is an empirical question whether similarity-based (e.g., quality of information) or nonsimilarity-based processes (e.g., quantity of information) provide the best account of the data. Future research that combines collection of decision and response time data with a comprehensive cognitive model such as the ex-LBA model will be required to discriminate these competing theoretical accounts.
Comparing Dynamic Induction and Recognition
Another important goal of the current studies was to use the modeling of decisions and response times to perform a fine-grained comparison of the processes involved in recognition and inductive reasoning. As in previous work (Hayes et al., 2013; Hayes & Heit, 2013a; Heit & Hayes, 2011) , both studies found a close empirical relationship between recognition and induction decisions. However, positive responding to novel items was more frequent under induction instructions.
Such a difference in responding could reflect the operation of a variety of different processes over time. It could reflect the use of different types of similarity-based information in induction and recognition (as reflected in the ex-LBA sensitivity parameter), task differences in the amount of evidence required for making a response (as reflected in decision threshold parameters), or some combination of both processes.
The application of the ex-LBA model to decision and response time data in each task resolved this issue. In both experiments, people set a lower threshold for positive responses in induction as compared to recognition. Hence, our strongest finding was that induction could be interpreted as a less cautious form of recognition. This is important because it reinforces the view that the processes involved in recognition and induction are more similar than is generally acknowledged. Rather than treating inductive reasoning and recognition memory as 2 This account of typicality effects in induction differs from that proposed by Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, and Shafir (1990) , who attribute the effect to the higher "coverage" associated with typical items (i.e., that such items have higher maximum similarity to members of the category that includes premises and conclusions). An account of typicality effects that resembles our approach was suggested by Lopez, Gelman, Gutheil, and Smith (1992) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
discrete cognitive activities, the current work suggests that they share many core processes; task differences are quantitative (i.e., take on different threshold parameters) rather than qualitative (i.e., requiring different model architectures).
In Experiment 1 and the speed condition of Experiment 2, there was also evidence of a weaker but nonetheless reliable difference in generalization gradients, with induction requiring a lower quality of similarity-based information than recognition. This could reflect differences in the level of detail required for the respective decisions; in induction, participants may have relied largely on category-level features (e.g., Is it the same kind of dog?), whereas accurate recognition is likely to have required encoding the details of individual items. This could also reflect the influence on induction of processes that cannot be easily reduced to the accumulation of exemplar-based similarity. For example, the coverage process described by Osherson et al. (1990) involves generalization decisions based on similarity to the lowest level superordinate category that includes the study items and at least some of the test items (e.g., large dogs). Alternatively, some induction decisions may have been based on background knowledge about the distribution of biological features like has beta cells (cf. Kemp & Tenenbaum, 2009) .
Teasing apart these alternatives is an important task for future research. However, we note that in previous modeling of induction decisions using a subset of the current stimuli (Heit & Hayes, 2011) , the addition of a category-level parameter to an exemplar-based similarity model generally led to only small improvements in predicting inductive responses. Hence, although adding category-level parameters to the ex-LBA may improve the fit to induction decision and response time data, it seems likely that induction will still differ from tasks like recognition in the quantity of similarity-based information required for a decision.
More generally, the current work could be seen as building on two important themes that have emerged in recent work on induction and recognition. The first is that methods developed in the study of recognition memory can yield novel insights into reasoning processes (for review, see Heit et al., 2012) . Heit (2009) and Heit and , for example, have shown that methods developed to study recognition, such as signal detection theory (SDT), can be used to examine whether deductive and inductive reasoning rely on different underlying processes. SDT methods have also yielded a novel interpretation of the belief bias effect in deductive reasoning, suggesting that the effect largely reflects a change in response bias (Dube, Rotello, & Heit, 2010; and can change depending on the feasibility of different reasoning strategies under different conditions (Trippas, Handley, & Verde, 2013; Trippas, Verde, & Handley, 2014) . The current work takes this idea a step further by showing that a sequential sampling framework that has been successful in modeling dynamic responding in tasks like recognition and perceptual decision making can be used to account for dynamic responding in induction.
The second general theme is the value of attempting to build theoretical models that account for data from ostensibly different cognitive tasks like induction and recognition. The current work shows that such modeling can reveal unexpected similarities and differences between the processes that drive performance in each task. We see this as a useful step toward building more general models of high-level cognition (see Hayes et al., 2014 , for further discussion).
Relations Between Induction, Recognition, and Categorization
Despite the differences in approach described earlier, there are some interesting parallels between our findings concerning the relations between induction and recognition and work examining the relations between recognition and categorization (e.g., Nosofsky, 1986; Nosofsky et al., 2012) . Perhaps the most striking parallel comes from Nosofsky et al. (2012) , who applied the generalized context model (GCM) to behavioral and brain imaging data from categorization and two different types of recognition. In standard recognition, participants were instructed to endorse a test item only if it was an exact match to a studied exemplar. In "lax" recognition, participants were told that it was important that they do not miss any old items. GCM modeling revealed that the major quantitative difference between the tasks was in the "criterion" for responding, roughly corresponding to the decision threshold parameter in our ex-LBA. The response criterion for standard recognition was higher than for categorization, whereas the criterion for decisions in lax recognition was similar to that for categorization.
Clearly, this is reminiscent of our finding that induction and recognition differed principally in their respective decision thresholds. Furthermore, given the strong empirical relation between recognition and categorization and categorization and induction (e.g., Rehder & Burnett, 2005; Rehder & Hastie, 2004) , it would be useful in future work to examine the overlap between recognition, induction, and categorization in a between-subjects design in which both decisions and response times are examined and modeled. Extension of the ex-LBA to categorization tasks is viable using similar categorization decision rules to the GCM. In a binary categorization task, the decision maker must determine whether a test probe belongs to Category A or B. The ex-LBA can calculate the similarity of the test probe to stored exemplars from Category A to determine a drift rate for Response A, and the similarity between the probe and stored exemplars from Category B to determine a drift rate for Response B, using the equations shown in Figure A1 . These drift rates then race in independent accumulators representing Responses A and B toward a decision threshold. Apart from accumulators racing in a pair of A or B accumulators rather than yes or no accumulators, this proposed model structure is otherwise identical to the ex-LBA described here.
Conclusions
We developed and empirically tested an exemplar-based sequential sampling model that conceptualizes inductive reasoning as a process of the gradual accumulation over time of evidence regarding the similarity between old and new instances until a decision threshold is reached. This model represents the first attempt to explain both decision and response time data in an inductive reasoning task. It also represents the first application of the sequential sampling approach to explaining temporal dynamics in induction. This approach was found to give a good account of dynamic decisions in induction. Moreover, a comparison with the modeling of recognition data revealed considerable overlap between the processes underlying reasoning and memory.
It is widely accepted that examination of the distribution of response times for decisions can greatly enhance understanding of the processes that underlie performance in a range of cognitive tasks. However, response time data have generally been ignored in This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
previous research on inductive reasoning. The current studies show that such data are extremely useful for constraining and testing models of property induction. In this respect, the future study of induction is likely to parallel the recent course of research on deductive reasoning, where measurement of response times and models that attempt to explain the time course of inferences are becoming increasingly prominent (e.g., Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013) .
Appendix A Exemplar-Based Linear Ballistic Accumulator (Ex-LBA) Model Details
In this appendix, we provide the technical details of the exemplarbased linear ballistic accumulator (ex-LBA) model introduced in the main text as applied to the data from Experiments 1 and 2. Next, we briefly describe the modifications required to fit the ex-LBA to the decision data (without response times) from Experiment 1a of Heit and Hayes (2011) . Finally, we show the variability in parameter estimates across individual participants to demonstrate that the hierarchical modeling approach adopted is unlikely to have masked between-participants differences in decision strategy. Figure A1 depicts the graphical model we used to analyze the joint distribution of decisions and response times in the ex-LBA framework. We use standard graphical model notation: Latent and observed variables are represented with open and shaded nodes, respectively; circular nodes represent continuous variables; and rectangular plates represent independent replications over test stimuli (T ϭ 80), participants within a condition (n ϭ 50), and conditions within the experiment (induction, recognition). We denote the joint variable of the decision (positive, negative) and the time taken to make it (response time) as y, such that the observed response (decision, response time) to test stimulus i from participant j in condition k, y ijk , is sampled from an LBA process. The LBA process has parameters for the rate of information accumulation for positive and negative responses (v ijk y and v ijk n , respectively), the maximum value of the start point of evidence accumulation (A jk ), separate response thresholds for positive and negative responses (b jk y and b jk n ), variability in drift rates (s jk ), and nondecision time ( jk ). We assume that the drift rate parameters v ijk y and v ijk n are deterministic functions of the total similarity of test item i to the set of S ϭ 20 study items. We used the Generalization from Examples (GEN-EX) equations (Heit & Hayes, 2011) that assume that the similarity between test item i and study item h, p hi , is transformed to a distance in psychological space, d hi . The distance is scaled by a parameter representing sensitivity to psychological distance, c jk , and the exponent of the negative of this value is summed over all study items to give the unnormalized drift rate for a positive response to test item i (equations given in Figure A1 ). This transformation follows the general form of the generalized context model (GCM) equations (Nosofsky, 1986; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997 
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i. 3 This simple constraint instantiates the assumption that a test item that is likely to receive a positive response is unlikely to receive a negative response, and vice versa, and also satisfies a scaling property common to sequential sampling models.
All ex-LBA model parameters were estimated at the subject level (A jk , b jk y , b jk n , s jk , jk ), including the sensitivity to psychological distance (c jk ). We assumed that these subject-level parameters were drawn hierarchically from population-level hyper-distributions. We assumed that c jk , A jk , b jk y , and b jk n were respectively sampled hierarchically from normal distributions with means (c k
) and standard deviations (c k
), truncated to nonnegative values and estimated separately for induction and recognition. 4 Given our experimental task, we had no a priori reason to suspect that nondecision time or the trial-to-trial variability in drift rates would differ across task conditions, so we made the simplifying assumption that these two parameters were sampled from population-level truncated normal distributions common to both recognition and induction (s , s , and , , respectively). We estimated ex-LBA parameters from the data using differential evolution Markov chain Monte Carlo (DE-MCMC; Turner, Sederberg, Brown, & Steyvers, 2013) , assuming the mildly informative prior distributions given in the lower right of Figure A1 . We took 4,000 posterior samples from each of the 40 chains with a burn-in period of 2,000 samples, giving a total of 80,000 samples from the posterior distributions of the parameters. The posterior distributions of all parameters converged according to the R statistic (Brooks & Gelman, 1998 ; R Ͻ 1.1 for all model parameters).
Fitting the Ex-LBA to Decision Data From Heit and Hayes (2011)
Sequential sampling models such as the ex-LBA can be fit to decision data in isolation (i.e., when response times are not available). The main idea is that one can fit the model to decisions-only-by integrating over the predicted distribution of response times to obtain marginal choice probabilities from the model (for details, see Hawkins et al., 2014b) . Without response times, however, some parameters of the model are no longer identifiable; some model parameters are only constrained by response time data. In particular, when response times are not available, one cannot uniquely identify the maximum value of the start-point distribution (A), both decision thresholds (b y and b n ), and the nondecision time parameter (), so these parameters were fixed at arbitrary values (A ϭ 0, b n ϭ 1, ϭ 0). One can, however, estimate drift rates (i.e., the sensitivity parameter, c), one of the decision thresholds (b y ), and the trial-to-trial variability of the drift rate distribution (s).
In the main text, we fit the decision data from Experiment 1a of Heit and Hayes (2011) ) and common sensitivity parameter and drift rate variability across conditions (c, s). Both models provided an equally good fit to the data (see Figure 2 of the main text) but led to different theoretical conclusions.
Individual Variability in Parameter Estimates
A key assumption of the hierarchical modeling approach used here is that participant-level parameter estimates are treated as random samples from group-or population-level distributions. The hierarchical approach provides many theoretical and practical benefits (e.g., enhanced ability to estimate parameters from sparse data). However, in our implementation, it also imposes the assumption that participants come from common group-level (truncated normal, in our case) distributions. If there is substantial between-participants variability in strategy differences-for example, distinct subclusters of participants in different regions of the parameter space-then such a hierarchical approach could potentially mask important between-participants differences or provide misleading conclusions about the population. 3 The drift rate for a positive response to test item i was normalized by the maximum drift rate for a positive response across all T ϭ 80 test items. The drift rate normalization does not change the implications for psychological processes or the quality of fit shown in Figures 3, 5, 7 , or 8 when examined in the context of a single condition (i.e., recognition or induction). Rather, normalizing the drift rates facilitates comparison of model parameters across recognition and induction. Without normalized drift rates, differences in the sensitivity parameter (c) across conditions would alter the scale of the evidence accumulation process for the remaining model parameters (i.e., A, b y , and b n ) and may lead one to conclude differences in those parameters between recognition and induction that would be a function of the model scale rather than differences in latent psychological processes. 4 To ensure that the response threshold parameters were larger than the maximum value of the start-point distribution, we estimated the values b y -A and b n -A, constrained to nonnegative values as per the prior distributions.
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This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Figure A2 explores the issue of between-participants variability in parameter estimates. For each participant, we calculated the median of the participant-level posterior distribution over parameters, shown as scatterplots in the upper right section of the figure. Overall, there are some weakly positive correlations between a few model parameters (e.g., between the sensitivity parameter and the decision thresholds). All correlations are well within the standard range for sequential sampling models and are indeed lower than observed in other applications (e.g., Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002) . The scatterplots provide no indication that there might be distinct clusters of participants for any model parameter. Thus, we argue that the hierarchical Bayesian modeling approach used here is unlikely to have masked the ability to detect between-participants strategy differences.
(Appendices continue) τ Figure A2 . Scatterplots of the association between parameters of the exemplar-based LBA model (upper right) and the absolute value of the associated Pearson correlation coefficients (lower left) from Experiment 1. The diagonal gives the symbol for each model parameter: c ϭ sensitivity parameter; A ϭ maximum value of the start-point distribution; b y and b n ϭ decision thresholds for positive and negative responses, respectively; ϭ nondecision time; s ϭ standard deviation of the trial-to-trial variability in drift rates. Each participant is represented with a separate symbol, where black circles and gray crosses represent participants from the reasoning and memory conditions, respectively. The lines in each panel represent a smoothed curve of the bivariate relationship. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Appendix B Stimulus Set Development
In this appendix, we describe the development of the 80 stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2. We began with the stimulus set of 45 color photographs of dogs used by Heit and Hayes (2011) . Each photograph showed a dog in a standing, left-facing position, 300 ϫ 300 pixels in size, sourced from the American Kennel Club (2013). To increase the size of the stimulus set, we sourced an additional 35 color photographs with the same properties (i.e., left-facing, 300 ϫ 300 pixels, American Kennel Club) for a total of 80 stimuli. We allocated photographs of 20 large dogs to comprise the study set, and all 80 stimuli were used for the test set.
Pairwise Similarity Ratings
We assumed that the confusability of study and test items was a function of global similarity between the study and test items. We collected a large number of similarity ratings for use in our analysis and modeling. In particular, we required a total of 1,600 pairwise similarity ratings between the 20 study items and 80 test items; we did not collect similarity ratings between all test items, as this would have required an additional 4,800 pairwise similarity ratings that were not crucial to our primary thesis. We considered 1,600 pairwise ratings to be too many for each participant to complete, so we broke the task into smaller units, collected 160 pairwise ratings from each participant, and increased the number of participants from whom we collected ratings data. Using pure randomization, each participant would not necessarily see all of the 80 test items, so we pseudorandomized the test items that participants observed to ensure that each participant saw stimuli that spanned a range in similarity to the study items. Specifically, for the purposes of collecting similarity ratings, we broke the 60 test items that were not on the study list into three broad categories of 20 stimuli each: large dogs that were not allocated to the study list, medium dogs, and small dogs. Each study item was paired with a random selection of two items from each of the four categories (i.e., old-large, new-large, medium, and small). For example, Study Item 1 was randomly paired with two of the 20 study items, two of the 20 new large items, two of the 20 medium items, two of the 20 small items, and so on for the remaining 19 study items. This method ensured that each participant saw approximately the same range of stimuli.
We used simulation studies to determine the sample size required to obtain a minimum number of observations (similarity ratings) in any cell of the 20 ϫ 80 similarity matrix. We assumed that a minimum of 15 ratings for any of the 1,600 cells was sufficient, which implies an average expected cell count of approximately 31 and a sample size of approximately 630 participants. Each participant provided 160 similarity ratings according to the pseudorandomization procedure described above and did not participate in the experiments reported in the main text. Each stimulus pair was presented for a minimum of 3 s, after which participants were asked to rate the similarity of the two stimuli on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ not similar, 7 ϭ highly similar). The pictures remained on screen until a rating was entered, after which there was a 1-s interval before the next trial commenced. The on-screen position of the two stimuli (left, right) was randomly assigned on each trial.
To identify participants who did not attend to the task, we randomly interleaved five catch trials within the 160 similarity ratings (for a total of 165 ratings). Catch trials presented two photos of well-known public figures in U.S. media. For two of the catch trials, the two photos were of the same celebrity (but different photos) and in the remaining three catch trials, the two photos were of different celebrities. Participants were asked to rate how sure they were that the two photos were of the same celebrity on a 7-point scale (1 ϭ I am sure they are different people, 7 ϭ I am sure they are the same person). We classified correct responses as a rating of 1 or 2 for different catch trials and 6 or 7 for same catch trials. We employed a relatively strict criterion and excluded a participant's set of 160 similarity ratings if he or she incorrectly responded to more than one catch trial. This criterion excluded data from 83 participants (13%). After screening, the minimum cell count was 13, the maximum was 48, and 95% of the 1,600 cells had between 18 and 38 observations with a mean of 27.7. Finally, similarity ratings were normalized to the interval [0, 1] (i.e., subtract 1 from all scores, then divide by 6) and averaged across participants. Figure B1 shows the mean similarity rating for each item in the stimulus set. As expected, the study items (crosses) were generally rated as most similar, and the 60 new items for the test set (circles) demonstrated a smooth gradation from some overlap with the study items through to highly dissimilar from the study items.
Robustness of the Similarity Ratings
As described in Appendix A, the drift rate parameters of the ex-LBA model fit to the data from Experiments 1 and 2 in the main text (obtained from participants sampled from a university student population) were constrained by the similarity ratings (obtained from participants sampled from Amazon Mechanical Turk [MTurk] ). It is possible that MTurk participants who were asked to rate the pairwise similarity between two items used a different task strategy than the university students who were asked to make generalization or recognition judgments for those same stimuli. This difference in task requirements might have introduced systematic distortions to our set of obtained similarity ratings relative to a hypothetical set of similarity ratings that may have been observed if we had obtained such ratings from the university students, which has the potential to bias the drift rate parameter estimates of the ex-LBA model.
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We conducted a simulation study to demonstrate that our similarity ratings are robust to the difference in sample populations and that this is unlikely to have any substantial effect on the parameter estimates reported in the main text. We used a bootstrapping procedure to obtain a measure of the correlation between the observed mean similarity ratings (described above and used for modeling in the main text) and resampled participant samples. Specifically, for a range of hypothetical participant sample sizes (n ϭ 50, 100, 150, 250, and 500), we resampled n participants with replacement from the N ϭ 554 participants in the MTurk sample. We repeated this process 1,000 times for each of the n hypothetical sample sizes, and for each of those 1,000 bootstrap samples, we computed the Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) between the observed mean similarity ratings and the resampled mean similarity ratings. We repeated this procedure using two different resampling methods:
1. Directly resampling from the raw, individual participant similarity ratings. We then averaged over the resampled participants to obtain a set of resampled mean similarity ratings.
2. Resampling from individual participant similarity ratings that were then perturbed by noise. In this version, we added noise to each similarity rating from each resampled participant by sampling uniformly from a range of 1 below to 1 above the observed rating, bounded by the response scale. For example, if a participant gave a similarity rating of 4 to a particular pair of stimuli, the resampled similarity rating was randomly sampled from 3, 4, or 5. For observed ratings of 1 or 7, at the edges of the response scale, the resampled values were randomly sampled from 1, 2 or 6, 7, respectively. The noise-perturbed, resampled participant-level ratings were then averaged in the same manner as the first bootstrap procedure. This approach was based on the idea that even if the MTurk and university student samples had different task goals, it is unlikely that the resulting similarity ratings would be completely unrelated.
The two bootstrapping approaches led to the same conclusion: There was a strong positive correlation between the observed similarity ratings (used for modeling in the main text) and the resampled similarity ratings, even when those individual participant similarity ratings were perturbed by noise ( Figure B2 ). As the sample size of the resampled similarity ratings increased, so, too, did the strength of correlation. This is primarily due to missing or sparse data: Our similarity matrix contained 20 ϫ 80 entries (1,600 cells). Each participant provided only 160 ratings. The simulation study described above indicated that obtaining a minimum of 15 ratings per cell required approximately 630 participants when each participant provided 160 ratings. Thus, when we resampled with smaller sample sizes that are more feasible of a university student population, there was a weaker positive correlation between the observed mean similarity ratings and the resampled mean similarity ratings, but there was also a large number of cells that did not (Appendices continue) Figure B1 . Mean similarity ratings for the 80 test stimuli, sorted from highest to lowest similarity. Items from the study and test sets are shown as crosses and circles, respectively. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
contain even a single rating from any participant. In particular, with a resampling size of 50 participants, there were an average of 138 cells (out of 1,600, or 8.6%) without a single rating. This dropped to approximately 15 and two cells for a sample size of 100 and 150 participants, respectively. Given these results, we believe that a large sample size was necessary to obtain reliable similarity ratings. Our bootstrapping study suggests that for the larger sample sizes, the observed similarity ratings are not likely to be heavily influenced by potential differences in task goals between the MTurk sample (similarity ratings) and the university student sample (main studies). Noise−Perturbed Bootstrap Figure B2 . Distributions of Pearson's correlation coefficient (r) between the observed mean similarity ratings and the resampled mean similarity ratings, shown separately for two resampling methods. The left panel shows the results of directly resampling from the raw, individual participant similarity ratings, and the right panel shows resampling from individual participant similarity ratings that were perturbed by noise. Grayscale shows the five hypothetical sample sizes used in the bootstrapping procedure.
